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1 Introduction
A ranking rule (\social welfare function") aggregates individual preferences
into a (collective) social preference. Arrow's Impossibility Theorem [1963]
points out the diculty of designing ranking rules: if a ranking rule for more
than two alternatives satises the Pareto principle and IIA (\independence
of irrelevant alternatives"), then it is dictatorial. There are several ways to
escape from this negative conclusion.1
One way is to limit the number of alternatives to two. In that case, IIA
becomes vacuous; the simple majority rule, for instance, satises Arrow's
conditions.2 In fact, it is the only rule (May, 1952) that satises anonymity
(equal treatment of individuals), neutrality (equal treatment of alternatives),
and positive responsiveness (if x is socially at least as good as y, then an
increased support for x relative to y makes x socially preferred to y).
Another way is to discard IIA. This allows us to consider various scoring
rules, which rank alternatives according to the total score received from
all individuals: if an individual's preference is a linear order a1a2 : : : am
(where ak is the kth ranked alternative), then a1 receives sm 1 points, a2
receives sm 2 points, . . . , and am receives s0 points from the individual
(sm 1  sm 2      s0 and sm 1 > s0). Scoring rules can be viewed as a
generalization of simple majority rule to three or more alternatives.
A typical example of a scoring rule is the Borda rule [1781]. It refers to
any scoring rule (viewed as a ranking rule) such that the dierence between
the consecutive scores sk is constant (sm 1   sm 2 = sm 2   sm 3 =    =
s1 s0). It is the unique scoring rule that minimizes \the kinds and number
of paradoxes that can occur" (Saari, 1990). Also, it is the only scoring rule
that (regardless of the population size) never top-ranks a Condorcet loser
(an alternative beaten by all other alternatives in pairwise majority com-
parisons) (Fishburn and Gehrlein, 1976; Okamoto and Sakai, 2013). The
objective of this paper is to present a set of conditions (axioms) that char-
acterize the Borda rule.
May's three conditions (suitably modied for more than two alterna-
tives) alone do not single out the Borda rule. (Every scoring rule satises
anonymity and neutrality; if the scores are decreasing, it satises positive
responsiveness.) Replacing anonymity, I show (Theorem 1) that within the
class of all ranking rules, the conditions that I call \Reversal," \Positive
1For example, if there are innitely many individuals, non-dictatorial rules exist that
satisfy Arrow's conditions (e.g., Kirman and Sondermann (1972)). But as soon as we
require the rules to be algorithmically computable (a requirement that any real-world
voting rules satisfy), the negative conclusion prevails again (Mihara, 1997).
2The restriction to two alternatives can be relaxed, provided that transitivity of social
preferences is replaced by a weaker requirement (such as \acyclicity") that ensures the
existence of a maximal alternative. If the number of alternatives is less than an integer
called the Nakamura number of the rue, then maximal alternatives always exist (Naka-
mura, 1979; Kumabe and Mihara, 2011).
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Responsiveness," and \Pairwise Cancellation" characterize the Borda rule.
One can substitute \Neutrality" for \Reversal" (Corollary 1). Also, none of
the three conditions is redundant (Section 4.1).
Reversal is similar to May's version of neutrality: it requires that a re-
versal of the individuals' preferences between two alternatives reverse the
social preference between them. Reversal is distinguished from the stronger
(Lemma 2) Neutrality condition, usually dened for three or more alterna-
tives. Positive responsiveness is similar to May's. I express an individual's
increased support for x relative to y in terms of the dierences between the
lower-contour set (\worse set") of x and that of y.3
Positional Cancellation is the requirement that (nontrivial) changes in
the relative positions of two alternatives that cancel each other do not alter
the social preference between the two. For example, each prole in the
following sequence should give the same social ranking of x and y:
R1 = (xaby; axby; ybax);
R2 = (axby; xaby; ybax);
R3 = (axby; xayb; ybxa);
R4 = (xbay; xayb; yabx):
In going from R1 to R2, for example, the relative position of (x; y) decreases
by 1 for individual 1 and increases by 1 for individual 2, while the preference
of individual 3 is xed. Positional Cancellation is a distinctive character-
istic of the Borda rule, a dening characteristic within the class of scoring
rules. However, we cannot restrict our attention to the scoring rules in
proving Theorem 1, since the other two conditions (Reversal and Positive
Responsiveness) do not imply that the rule is a scoring rule (Example 3).
Along the way to proving Theorem 1, I prove Proposition 1, which is
of independent interest, asserting that these three conditions imply Relative
Positions. The condition requires that changes in individual preferences
that preserve the relative position of two alternatives do not alter the social
preference between the two.4 To see the dierence between Positional Can-
cellation and Relative Positions, observe that the relative position of (x; y)
is the same for R1 as for R4. Also, it is the same for R5 = (xaby; xbay; xaby)
as for R6 = (xbay; xaby; xaby). Relative Positions immediately implies the
conclusion that the social ranking of x and y is the same for R1 as for R4;
also, it is the same for R5 as for R6. In contrast, Positional Cancellation
implies the conclusion for R1 and R4, because there exists a sequence like
(R1; R2; R3; R4) that begins with one and ends with the other. For two
proles to be comparable according to Positional Cancellation, there must
3This is analogous to the way (say, when dening monotonic social choice rules) we
often express an increased support for x as an expansion of the lower-contour set of x.
4Relative Positions is a weakening of Arrow's IIA. It is equivalent to Saari's \Intensity
IIA" (Saari, 1995, Denition 3.4.1).
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exist a sequence like that. The idea is that a symmetrical treatment of two
proles is justied only if the change from one to the other produces iden-
tiable nontrivial marginal eects that cancel each other. For this reason,
Positional Cancellation is not sucient for concluding that the social rank-
ing of x and y is the same for R5 as for R6.5 Combined with Reversal and
Positive Responsiveness, however, the condition gives the conclusion.
I use Proposition 1 to prove (Lemma 4) that changes in individual pref-
erences that preserve the dierences (i.e., the sum of the individuals' relative
positions) between the Borda scores of two alternatives do not alter the so-
cial preference between the two. Once this is proved, the proof of Theorem 1
is easy. What I actually do is to prove the theorem by way of a proposition
(Proposition 2) that appears to be mathematically stronger.6
Pattanaik (2002) surveys the literature on the class of rules that include
the scoring rules. Well-known characterizations of the Borda rule are ob-
tained for variable sets of individuals: Young (1974) characterizes the Borda
choice rule and Nitzan and Rubinstein (1981) characterize the Borda ranking
rule. Their characterizations are sharply distinct from mine, because they
include the \consistency" condition concerning the union of dierent sets of
individuals. For a xed set of individuals, Sato (2017) nicely complements
the present paper. He characterizes the Borda choice rule by three condi-
tions similar to mine, assuming linearly ordered preferences. In Section 4.2,
I discuss the relation of these works with mine.
2 Framework
Let N = f1; : : : ; ng (where n  2) denote a nite set of individuals. Let X
be a nite set of (symbols labeling) alternatives, which has #X = m  2
alternatives. Let R be the set of preferences, i.e., complete and transitive
binary relations on X. Let P be the set of linear orders on X (so Q 2 P
if and only if Q 2 R and [xQy and yQx] implies x = y). A prole R =
(R1; : : : ; Rn) is an element of Rn. When R 2 Rn, xRiy means that \for
individual i, x is at least as good as y." As usual, I write xPiy (\i prefers x
to y") if and only if xRiy but not yRix. Also, xIiy (\i is indierent between
x and y") if and only if xRiy and yRix.
I represent each preference Q 2 R by a string. For example, when
5Cancellations cannot occur with respect to (x; y): every individual can decrease the
relative position of (x; y), but no individual can increase it. Considering transitivity of
social preferences is not helpful, either. If the social preference for R5 is xyab, Positional
Cancellation implies that both x and y are preferred to a and b at R6, but it does not
determine the ranking of x and y.
6The proposition is closely related to the main theorem of a paper (Sato, 2017) that I
noticed this month. The proof of the proposition is very similar to the one (which could
have been shorter!) I gave to the Theorem 1, which was independently obtained.
4
X = fa; b; c; d; e; f; gg, (abusing the symbol) I write
Q = [abc][d][e][fg] = [abc]de[fg]
to express the preference that ranks a, b, and c (which are indierent) rst,
d second, e third, f and g (which two are indierent) last. More formally,
an indierence string is a string [x1 : : : xl] of (the symbols labeling) distinct
alternatives in brackets, where 1  l  m. A partial preference string is
a string [x11 : : : x
1
l(1)] : : : [x
k
1 : : : x
k
l(k)] of indierence strings (1  l(1) +    +
l(k)  m), in which each alternative x 2 X appears at most once. If each
alternative x 2 X appears exactly once, then a partial preference string
is called a (total) preference string. The partial preference string above
represents any preference Q 2 R satisfying xjlQxj
0
l0 if and only if j  j0 for
all l, l0, j, j0. When an indierence string within a preference string consists
of just one alternative, I write x instead of [x].
A ranking rule is a mapping G : Rn ! R that maps each prole R =
(R1; : : : ; Rn) to a social preference G(R). Let G
+(R) be the strict preference
corresponding to G(R): xG+(R)y if and only if xG(R)y but not yG(R)x.
Given an individual i 2 N , her preference Ri 2 R, and an alternative
x 2 X, let bi(x) = b(x;Ri) := #fa 2 X : xPiag be the position of x in Ri.
Also, let
(x; y) = (x; y;Ri) := b(x;Ri)  b(y;Ri) = #fa : xPiag  #fa : yPiag
be the position of x relative to y. Note that for each x, y, Ri: (i) (y; x;Ri) =
 (x; y;Ri); (ii) if xIiy, then (x; y;Ri) = 0; (iii) if xPiy, then (x; y;Ri)
is the number of alternatives worse than x and at least as good as y. For
example, if X = fa; b; c; d; e; f; gg and Ri = [abc]de[fg], then (a; b) = 0,
(a; d) = 1, and (d; f) = 3.
Lemma 1 Let x, y 2 X be two distinct alternatives. Then, for any integer
d, we have d = (x; y;Q) for some preference Q 2 R if and only if d belongs
to [ m+ 1;m  1]. That is,
f(x; y;Q) : Q 2 Rg = fd 2 Z :  m+ 1  d  m  1g:
Proof. For each k, where 0  k  m   2, let uk be a partial preference
string consisting of k alternatives dierent from x and y, and vk one con-
sisting of the remaining m  2  k alternatives. Given distinct x and y, the
preference Q = [xy]vm 2 gives (x; y;Q) = 0; Q = xukyvk gives (x; y;Q) =
k+1 2 [1;m  1]; Q = yukxvk gives (x; y;Q) =  k  1 2 [ m+1; 1].
When the positions b(z;Ri) of alternatives z 2 X are viewed as \scores"
that can be summed, we obtain the Borda (ranking) rule: it is a ranking
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rule B : Rn !R dened for each prole R = (R1; : : : ; Rn) and for each pair
(x; y) 2 X2 of alternatives by
xB(R)y ()
X
i2N
b(x;Ri) 
X
i2N
b(y;Ri)
where b(z;Ri) = #fa : zPiag is the score received by z 2 X from i. The
sum
P
i2N b(z;Ri) is called the Borda score of z.
Observe that using the relative positions, one can rewrite the Borda rule
as:
xB(R)y ()
X
i2N
(x; y;Ri)  0:
Observe also that the strict social preference B+(R) satises:
xB+(R)y ()
X
i2N
(x; y;Ri) > 0:
The Borda rule is a scoring rule (with (s0; s1; : : : ; sm 1) = (0; 1; : : : ;m 
1)) dened as follows:7 A mapping G : Rn ! R is a scoring rule if there
is an m-tuple (s0; s1; : : : ; sm 1) of numbers (where m = #X) such that
s0  s1      sm 1 with s0 < sm 1, and for all R 2 Rn and x, y 2 X,
xG(R)y ()
X
i2N
sb(x;Ri) 
X
i2N
sb(y;Ri):
To dene the neutrality conditions, let  : X ! X be a permutation
on X. Given a prole R 2 Rn, denote by R the prole obtained from
R by relabeling alternatives (or by reordering actual alternatives without
relabeling them, under a dierent interpretation): for each i and each z,
w 2 X, (z)Ri (w) , zRiw. If  is the transposition of z and w (so the
other elements are xed), I write R = Rzw. For example, if R = abc[de],
then Rad = dbc[ae]. Note that for each x, y, Ri:
(x; y;Rxyi ) = (y; x;Ri) =  (x; y;Ri):
I say that G : Rn ! R is Neutral if for each R 2 Rn, for each permuta-
tion , and for each (x; y), we have xG(R)y , (x)G(R)(y). The Neutral-
ity condition remains unaltered if \for each permutation " in the denition
is replaced by \for each transposition  of two alternatives z and w," since
every permutation is a product of transpositions.8 For the main result of the
paper, the following weakening of Neutrality suces:
7There are other denitions, but they usually agree on the subdomain Pn of linear
orders.
8Unlike other variants, the Neutrality condition dened here is not a strengthening
of Arrow's IIA (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives) Arrow (1963), which I want to
avoid in view of Arrow's theorem. It indeed is not, since the Borda rule satises this
condition, but violates the IIA.
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Denition 1 A ranking rule G : Rn ! R satises Reversal if for each
R 2 Rn and for each (x; y) 2 X2, we have: xG(R)y , yG(Rxy)x.
Lemma 2 Every Neutral ranking rule satises Reversal. For each m  3,
there is a ranking rule that satises Reversal but violates Neutrality.
The proof is in Appendix A.
To dene positive responsiveness, Let Rj , R
0
j 2 R be preferences of j 2 N
and x, y 2 X alternatives. I say that R0j has more support for (x; y) than Rj
if (i) fz : xPjzRjyg  fz : xP 0jzR0jyg, (ii) fz : yPjzRjxg  fz : yP 0jzR0jxg,
and (iii) either  in (i) is strict ( or  in (ii) is strict ). I illustrate boundary
cases for X = fx; y; ag: the preference xya has more support for (x; y) than
yxa; xya than [yx]a; [xy]a than yxa. Recall that G+(R0) is the strict part
of G(R0).
Denition 2 A ranking rule G : Rn ! R satises Positive Responsive-
ness (or is Positively Responsive) if for each (R;R0) 2 RnRn and for each
(x; y) 2 X2, whenever for some j,
R0j has more support for (x; y) than Rj
and for all i 6= j, R0i = Ri;
we have
xG(R)y ) xG+(R0)y:
Remark 1 If (a)R0j has more support for (x; y) thanRj , then (b) (x; y;R
0
j) >
(x; y;Rj). The converse is not true, however, as the following examples
show: (i) Rj = axbyc and R
0
j = bxacy; (ii) Rj = yabxc and R
0
j = ycxab.
One could replace (a) by (b) at the cost of making the Positive Responsive-
ness condition more demanding.
The following condition captures the distinctive characteristics of the
Borda rule.
Denition 3 A ranking rule G : Rn ! R satises Positional Cancella-
tion if for each (R;R0) 2 Rn Rn and for each (x; y) 2 X2, whenever for
some j and l,
(x; y;R0j) = (x; y;Rj) + 1;
(x; y;R0l) = (x; y;Rl)  1;
for all i =2 fj; lg, R0i = Ri;
we have
xG(R)y ) xG(R0)y:
By symmetry, \)" in the last line can be replaced by \,".
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3 The Results
I rst introduce two equivalent (Lemma 3) conditions, which are a conse-
quence (Proposition 1) of Reversal, Positive Responsiveness, and Positional
Cancellation. A ranking rule G : Rn ! R satises Relative Positions,
if for each (R;R0) 2 Rn  Rn and for each (x; y) 2 X2, whenever for
all i, (x; y;R0i) = (x; y;Ri), we have xG(R)y ) xG(R0)y.9 G : Rn ! R
satises Relative Positions 2, if for each (R;R0) 2 Rn  Rn and for
each (x; y) 2 X2, whenever for some j and l (not necessarily distinct),
(x; y;R0j) = (x; y;Rj) and (x; y;R
0
l) = (x; y;Rl), and for all i =2 fj; lg,
R0i = Ri, we have xG(R)y ) xG(R0)y.
Lemma 3 A ranking rule G : Rn ! R satises Relative Positions if and
only if it satises Relative Positions 2.
Proof. (=)). Obvious.
((=). Suppose that G satises Relative Positions 2. Suppose that
(x; y;R0i) = (x; y;Ri) for all i and xG(R)y. We show that xG(R
0)y. We
can assume n  3 without loss of generality.
Let R1, R2, . . . , Rn 1 be the proles dened by
R = (R1; R2; R3; R4; R5; : : : ; Rn 1; Rn)
R1 = (R01; R
0
2; R3; R4; R5; : : : ; Rn 1; Rn)
R2 = (R01; R
0
2; R
0
3; R4; R5; : : : ; Rn 1; Rn)
R3 = (R01; R
0
2; R
0
3; R
0
4; R5; : : : ; Rn 1; Rn)
: : :
Rn 1 = (R01; R
0
2; R
0
3; R
0
4; R
0
5; : : : ; R
0
n 1; R
0
n) = R
0
Since xG(R)y, Relative Positions 2 implies xG(R1)y. Next, since (x; y;R23) =
(x; y;R03) = (x; y;R3) = (x; y;R13), R2j = R
1
j for all j 6= 3, and xG(R1)y,
Relative Positions 2 (for j = l) implies xG(R2)y. Repeating the same argu-
ment, we obtain xG(Rn 1)y; that is, xG(R0)y.
Proposition 1 If a ranking rule G : Rn ! R satises Reversal, Positive
Responsiveness, and Positional Cancellation, then it satises Relative Posi-
tions.
Proof. Suppose that G satises the three conditions. By Lemma 3,
it suces to prove Relative Positions 2. Suppose (x; y;R0j) = (x; y;Rj),
(x; y;R0l) = (x; y;Rl), for all i =2 fj; lg, R0i = Ri, and xG(R)y. We show
xG(R0)y. There are three cases to consider.
9By symmetry, \)" can be replaced by \,".
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Case 1:10 (x; y;Ri) = m   1 for all i. We show xG+(R0)y. Suppose
yG(R0)x.
Claim. Let R0 be any prole satisfying (x; y;R0i ) =  m + 1 for all i.
Then yG+(R0)x.
To prove the Claim, suppose xG(R0)y.
Given i, since (x; y;R0i) = m  1, we can write R0i = xw[: : : y], where w
is a partial preference string and [: : : y] is an indierence string containing y
(x is the only best element and y is one of the worst elements). Similarly,
R0i = yw
0[: : : x] for some w0. It is then easy to see that R0i has more support
for (x; y) than R0i .
Let R1, R2, . . . , Rn be the proles dened by
R0 = (R01; R
0
2; R
0
3; : : : ; R
0
n 1; R
0
n)
R1 := (R01; R
0
2; R
0
3; : : : ; R
0
n 1; R
0
n)
R2 := (R01; R
0
2; R
0
3; : : : ; R
0
n 1; R
0
n)
: : :
Rn 1 := (R01; R
0
2; R
0
3; : : : ; R
0
n 1; R
0
n)
Rn := (R01; R
0
2; R
0
3; : : : ; R
0
n 1; R
0
n) = R
0:
First, R11 = R
0
1 has more support for (x; y) than R
0
1; R
1
i = R
0
i for all
i 6= 1. So xG(R0)y and Positive Responsiveness imply xG+(R1)y.
Second, R22 = R
0
2 has more support for (x; y) than R
1
2 = R
0
2; R
2
i = R
1
i
for all i 6= 2. So xG(R1)y and Positive Responsiveness imply xG+(R2)y.
Repeating the same argument, we get xG+(Rn)y; that is, xG+(R0)y.
This contradicts the assumption (the rst paragraph of Case 1) that yG(R0)x. k
Let R0 := (R0)xy be obtained from R0 by transposing x and y. Since
yG(R0)x, Reversal implies xG(R0)y. On the other hand, since R0 satis-
es (x; y;R0i ) =  m + 1 for all i, the Claim implies yG+(R0)x. These
conclusions contradict each other.
Case 2: (x; y;Ri) =  m + 1 for all i. Case 1 implies that for (R0; R)
and for (y; x): if (y; x;Ri) = (y; x;R
0
i) = m  1 for all i, then yG(R0)x)
yG+(R)x. Since the antecedent of this statement is true in this case, the
consequent (whose contrapositive is \xG(R)y ) xG+(R0)y") is true. The
assumption xG(R)y implies xG+(R0)y.
Case 3:11 Otherwise. There are two cases:
Case 3.1: Either (a) (x; y;Rj) 6= m   1 & (x; y;Rl) 6=  m + 1 or
(b) (x; y;Rj) 6=  m+ 1 & (x; y;Rl) 6= m  1. Assume (a) without loss of
10Positional Cancellation is not used in this case.
11Neither Reversal nor Positive Responsiveness is used in this case.
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generality. Using Lemma 1, choose any R1 2 Rn satisfying that
(x; y;R1j ) = (x; y;Rj) + 1
(x; y;R1l ) = (x; y;Rl)  1
for all i =2 fj; lg, R1i = Ri:
Positional Cancellation, together with the assumption that xG(R)y at the
beginning of the proof, then implies xG(R1)y. Other assumptions there and
the choice of R1 imply that
(x; y;R0j) = (x; y;Rj) = (x; y;R
1
j )  1
(x; y;R0l) = (x; y;Rl) = (x; y;R
1
l ) + 1
for all i =2 fj; lg, R0i = Ri = R1i :
Positional Cancellation, together with xG(R1)y obtained above, then implies
xG(R0)y. This is what we wanted to show.
Case 3.2: Otherwise, we have n  3 and either (x; y;Rj) = (x; y;Rl) =
m   1 or (x; y;Rj) = (x; y;Rl) =  m + 1. Assume the rst case (both
are m   1) without loss of generality. Since R does not belong to Case 1,
there is a k =2 fj; lg such that (x; y;Rk) 6= m   1. Choose such k. Using
Lemma 1, we choose proles R1, R2, R3 2 Rn that are the same as R for
the individuals other than the three (that is, R1i = R
2
i = R
3
i = Ri for all
i =2 fj; k; lg) as follows:
1. Choose R1 2 Rn satisfying (x; y;R1j ) = (x; y;Rj)   1, (x; y;R1k) =
(x; y;Rk) + 1, and R
1
l = Rl. Positional Cancellation, together with
the assumption that xG(R)y, implies xG(R1)y.
2. Choose R2 2 Rn satisfying R2j = R0j , R2k = R1k, and (x; y;R2l ) =
(x; y;R1l ) 1. Then (x; y;R2j ) = (x; y;R0j) = (x; y;Rj) = (x; y;R1j )+
1. Positional Cancellation, together with xG(R1)y, implies xG(R2)y.
3. Choose (uniquely dened) R3 2 Rn satisfying R3j = R2j , R3k = Rk,
and R3l = R
0
l. Then (x; y;R
3
k) = (x; y;Rk) = (x; y;R
1
k)   1 =
(x; y;R2k) 1 and (x; y;R3l ) = (x; y;R0l) = (x; y;Rl) = (x; y;R1l ) =
(x; y;R2l )+1. Positional Cancellation, together with xG(R
2)y, implies
xG(R3)y.
Since R3j = R
2
j = R
0
j , R
3
l = R
0
l, and R
3
i = Ri = R
0
i for all i =2 fj; lg (the
last equation coming from the assumption at the beginning of the proof),
we have R3 = R0. Therefore xG(R3)y implies xG(R0)y.
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Lemma 4 Let G : Rn !R be a ranking rule that satises Positional Can-
cellation and Relative Positions. Let (R;R0) 2 Rn  Rn, (x; y) 2 X2, and
b1, . . . , bn 2 Z satisfy the following equations:
(x; y;R01) = (x; y;R1) + b1
(x; y;R02) = (x; y;R2) + b2
: : :
(x; y;R0n) = (x; y;Rn) + bnX
i2N
bi = 0
(these equations are satised only if for each i,  2m + 2  bi  2m   2).
Then
xG(R)y ) xG(R0)y:
Proof. The proof is by induction on the number k :=
P
i:bi0 bi  0.
If k = 0, then bi = 0 for all i such that bi  0. Since
P
bi = k +P
i:bi<0
bi = 0 by assumption, k = 0 implies bi = 0 for all i such that bi < 0.
It follows that for all i, (x; y;R0i) = (x; y;Ri). Relative Positions thus
implies xG(R)y ) xG(R0)y.
Suppose the induction hypothesis: the assertion is true for k = k. Sup-
pose that
P
i:bi0 bi =
k + 1. Choose j such that bj > 0. Since
P
bi = 0,
there is an l such that bl < 0. Choose such l. Using Lemma 1, choose
R00 2 Rn satisfying12
(x; y;R00j ) = (x; y;Rj) + bj   1
(x; y;R00l ) = (x; y;Rl) + bl + 1
for all i =2 fj; lg, R00i = R0i.
For i =2 fj; lg, observe that
(x; y;R00i ) = (x; y;R
0
i) = (x; y;Ri) + bi
and let ci := bi. Let cj := bj   1  0 and cl := bl + 1  0. Then
P
ci = 0
and X
i:ci0
ci = (bj   1) + (
X
i:bi0
bi   bj) =  1 + (k + 1) = k:
By the induction hypothesis, xG(R)y ) xG(R00)y. Now, we have
(x; y;R0j) = (x; y;R
00
j ) + 1
(x; y;R0l) = (x; y;R
00
l )  1
for all i =2 fj; lg, R0i = R00i .
12Such an R00j exists since  m+ 1  (x; y;Rj)  (x; y;R00j ) < (x; y;R0j)  m  1.
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Positional Cancellation implies xG(R00)y ) xG(R0)y; hence xG(R)y )
xG(R0)y.
Theorem 1 A ranking rule G : Rn ! R satises Reversal, Positive Re-
sponsiveness, and Pairwise Cancellation if and only if G is the Borda rule B : Rn !
R.
Theorem 1, together with Lemma 2, implies the following:
Corollary 1 A ranking rule G : Rn ! R satises Neutrality, Positive Re-
sponsiveness, and Pairwise Cancellation if and only if G is the Borda rule B.
The \(=" direction of Theorem 1 is immediate from the observation.
The \=)" direction will be proved via Proposition 2 below. While the
conditions in the proposition are eclectic, they do make the proposition
easily comparable with a certain result in the literature (Section 4.2).
A ranking rule G : Rn !R satises PR1 if for each (R;R0) 2 Rn Rn
and for each (x; y) 2 X2, whenever for some j and for some z 2 X,13
R0j equals Rj on X n fzg,
zIjx,
for all  such that xPj: [z 6= y & xP 0jzR0j] or [z = y & xP 0jzP 0j],
for all i 6= j, R0i = Ri;
we have xG(R)y ) xG+(R0)y.
Let Rxy 2 Rn be the prole obtained from R by transposing x and y.
G : Rn ! R satises IARPPT (Invariance under Average Relative Posi-
tion Preserving Transpositions) if for each R 2 Rn and for each (x; y) 2
X2, whenever
P
i2N (x; y;R
xy
i ) =
P
i2N (x; y;Ri), we have xG(R)y )
xG(Rxy)y.
Note that If G satises Positive Responsiveness, then it satises PR1.
Also, if G satises the three conditions in Theorem 1, then it satises Rela-
tive Positions by Proposition 1; hence it satises IARPPT by Lemma 4 for
R0 = Rxy. It follows that Theorem 1 is immediate from the following:
Proposition 2 If a ranking rule G : Rn ! R satises Reversal (or Neu-
trality), PR1, and IARPPT, then G is the Borda rule B.
13By \R0j equals Rj on X n fzg," I mean that for all x0, y0 2 X n fzg, x0R0jy0 , x0Rjy0.
In the rst three lines below, z that is as good as x is pushed right below x (z is included
in or placed above the indierence class just below that of x). Note that if these lines are
satised, then R0j has more support for (x; y) than Rj .
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Proof. Suppose that G satises the three conditions. We show that14
(i)
P
(x; y;Ri) = 0) xG(R)y & yG(R)x,
(ii)
P
(x; y;Ri) > 0) xG+(R)y and,
(iii)
P
(x; y;Ri) < 0) yG+(R)x.
Case (i). Suppose that
P
(x; y;Ri) = 0. To derive a contradiction,
suppose xG+(R)y without loss of generality. By Reversal, yG+(Rxy)x.
Since (x; y;Rxyi ) =  (x; y;Ri) for each i, we have
P
(x; y;Rxyi ) =
 P (x; y;Ri). Since the right hand side is zero by assumption,P (x; y;Rxyi ) =
0. It follows that X
(x; y;Rxyi ) =
X
(x; y;Ri):
IARPPT, together with the assumption that xG+(R)y, implies that xG(Rxy)y.
This contradicts the conclusion yG+(Rxy)x in the rst paragraph discussing
this case.
Case (ii). Suppose that
P
(x; y;Ri) > 0. We prove that xG
+(R)y by
induction on the number k :=
P
(x; y;Ri) from 1 to n(m  1).
First, suppose k = 1. Then there is a j such that (x; y;Rj) > 0.
Choose such j. Let R0j 2 R be obtained from Rj by moving a certain
z satisfying xPjzRjy so that j is indierent between x and z: if there is
a z 6= y satisfying the condition, choose any such z from the indierence
class right below x (e.g., if Rj = a[bx][cd][ye]f , then R
0
j = a[bxc]d[ye]f
and R0j = a[bxd]c[ye]f are obtained this way); otherwise let z = y (e.g., if
Rj = a[bx]yd, then R
0
j = a[bxy]d). Let R
0
i = Ri for all i 6= j. Observe
that (x; y;R0j) = (x; y;Rj)   1 and that (R0; R) satises the assumptions
in PR1. Then, since
P
(x; y;R0i) =
P
(x; y;Ri)  1 = k   1 = 0, Case (i)
implies xG(R0)y (as well as yG(R0)x). PR1 then implies xG+(R)y.
Suppose the induction hypothesis: the assertion is true for k = k. Sup-
pose that
P
(x; y;Ri) = k + 1. Choose j and R
0 2 Rn as in the case
k = 1. Observe that (x; y;R0j) = (x; y;Rj)   1, that (R0; R) satises
the assumptions in PR1, and that Ri = R
0
i for all i 6= j. Then, sinceP
(x; y;R0i) =
P
(x; y;Ri) 1 = (k+1) 1 = k, the induction hypothesis
implies xG+(R0)y. PR1 then implies xG+(R)y.
Case (iii). Suppose that
P
(x; y;Ri) < 0. We prove that yG
+(R)x.
Since (x; y;Rxyi ) =  (x; y;Ri) for each i, we have
P
(x; y;Rxyi ) =  
P
(x; y;Ri) >
0. Case (ii) implies xG+(Rxy)y. By Reversal, yG+(R)x.
14It is important to note that the proof does not depend on any consequences (such as
Proposition 1 or Lemma 4) of Positive Responsiveness or Positional Cancellation. If one
can use the conclusion of Lemma 4, the proof of Case (ii) is easier: choose any R0 satisfyingP
(x; y;R0i) =
P
(x; y;Ri) > 0 and (x; y;R
0
i)  0 for all i; use PR1 to compare R0 with
R0 where every individual is indierent between any two alternatives.
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4 Discussion
4.1 Minimality of the set of axioms
The following examples show that none of the three axioms in Theorem 1 is
redundant. I give examples for each set N of n  2 individuals and for each
set fa1; : : : ; amg of m  3 of alternatives (with the exception of the second
example in Example 3, where m  4 is assumed).
Example 1 Ranking rules that violate Reversal but satises the other two.
The rst example is the constant rule that always gives the linear order
a1 : : : am as an output. The second example is the ranking rule G that
equals the Borda rule except that it regards the alternative labeled am as
a \forbidden choice." It is dened as follows: xG+(R)am for all x dier-
ent from am; for any pair (x; y) of alternatives dierent from am, we have
xG(R)y , xB(R)y.
Example 2 Ranking rules that violate Positive Responsiveness but satises
the other two. The rst example is the constant rule that always gives the
total indierence [a1a2 : : : am]. The second example is the inverse G of the
Borda rule: xG(R)y , yB(R)x.
Example 3 Ranking rules that violate Positional Cancellation but satises
the other two.
The rst example is the non-anonymous rule that gives twice as much
weight to individual 1 as to the other individuals. Recall that b(x;Ri) =
#fa : xPiag and let bi(x;Ri) := 2b(x;Ri) if i = 1 and bi(x;Ri) := b(x;Ri) if
i 6= 1. DeneG by xG(R)y ,Pi bi(x;Ri) Pi bi(y;Ri). Let i(x; y;Ri) :=
bi(x;Ri)   bi(y;Ri). Then xG(R)y ,
P
i i(x; y;Ri)  0. Reversal can be
seen from the equation i(x; y;Ri) =  i(x; y;Rxyi ) for all i. To see Positive
Responsiveness, consider the cases j = 1 and j 6= 1, noting that (x; y;R0j) >
(x; y;Rj) implies j(x; y;R
0
j) > j(x; y;Rj). To see that Positional Cancel-
lation is violated, let R = (xayw; yaxw; yaxw; [xy]aw; : : : ; [xy]aw), where a
is another alternative and w is a string consisting of the remaining alterna-
tives. This gives xG(R)y (and yG(R)x). LetR0 = (xyaw; yxaw; yaxw; [xy]aw; : : : ; [xy]aw).
R andR0 satisfy the hypothesis of Positional Cancellation. However, yG+(R0)x.
The second example is the scoring rule (which is an anonymous rule)
with (s0; : : : ; sm 2; sm 1) = (0; : : : ;m   2;m   1=2). Suppose m  4 and
let ~b(x;Ri) := m   1=2 if b(x;Ri) = m   1 and ~b(x;Ri) := b(x;Ri) other-
wise. Dene G by xG(R)y , Pi ~b(x;Ri)  Pi ~b(y;Ri). Let ~(x; y;Ri) :=
~b(x;Ri) ~b(y;Ri), which is at most (x; y;Ri)+1=2 (if maxRi = fxg or fyg)
and at least (x; y;Ri) (otherwise). Then xG(R)y ,
P
i
~(x; y;Ri)  0. Re-
versal can be seen from the equation ~(x; y;Ri) =  ~(x; y;Rxyi ) for all i. To
see Positive Responsiveness, suppose the hypothesis. Then (x; y;R0j) >
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(x; y;Rj) (implying (x; y;R
0
j)  (x; y;Rj) + 1 since both sides are in-
tegers) and ~(x; y;R0i) = ~(x; y;Ri) for all i 6= j. Now xG(R)y impliesP
i
~(x; y;Ri)  0, which implies
 
X
i 6=j
~(x; y;Ri)  ~(x; y;Rj): (1)
The left-hand side of this inequality is equal to  Pi 6=j ~(x; y;R0i). For
the right-hand side, ~(x; y;Rj)  (x; y;Rj) + 1=2 < (x; y;Rj) + 1 
(x; y;R0j)  ~(x; y;R0j). Therefore, inequality (1) implies
P
i
~(x; y;R0i) >
0; hence xG+(R0)y. To see that Positional Cancellation is violated, let
R = (ayxbw; abxyw; [xy]abw; : : : ; [xy]abw), where a and b are other alterna-
tives and w is a string consisting of the remaining alternatives. This gives
xG(R)y (and yG(R)x). Let R0 = (yaxbw; axbyw; [xy]w0; : : : ; [xy]w0). R and
R0 satisfy the hypothesis of Positional Cancellation. However, yG+(R0)x.
4.2 Connection with results in the literature
[In a revised version, I am thinking of discussing the relationship between
this work and related results, such as May (1952); Young (1974); Nitzan and
Rubinstein (1981); Sato (2017).]
A The Proof of Lemma 2
Let N = f1; : : : ; ng and X = fa1; : : : ; amg, where m  3. Let  : R! R be
a function satisfying
 (Q) =
8><>:
a2a1w if Q is a linear order a1a2w for some w;
a1a2w if Q is a linear order a2a1w for some w;
Q otherwise;
where w denotes a (partial preference) string consisting of a3, . . . , am. Let
Fix := fQ :  (Q) = Qg be the set of xed points of  : it consists of the
preferences belonging to the third case in the denition of  . If Q is a linear
order, Q 2 Fix i either a1 or a2 ranks third or worse. We show that the
composition   B : Rn ! R of  and the Borda rule B is a non-Neutral
ranking rule satisfying Reversal. (In fact, instead of the Borda rule, we may
use any Neutral ranking rule whose image contains a linear order.) Clearly,
it is a ranking rule.
To show that   B satises Reversal, let R 2 Rn and x, y 2 X be
distinct alternatives. We want to show that
x( B)(R)y () y( B)(Rxy)x: (2)
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Along the way, we will also show that   B is not Nuetral. Since B is
Neutral, we have
xB(R)y () yB(Rxy)x: (3)
First, suppose that B(R) is not a linear order. Then, since B is Neutral,
B(Rxy) is not a linear order, either. (If z and w are indierent at B(R),
then for any permutation , (z) and (w) are indierent at B(R).) The
denition of  then implies B(R), B(Rxy) 2 Fix; therefore,
B(R) = ( B)(R) and B(Rxy) = ( B)(Rxy): (4)
The conclusion (2) then follows from (3).
Next, suppose that the Borda ranking B(R) is a linear order. Since B
is Neutral, B(Rxy) is a linear order as well. Write Rkl for the prole Rakal
obtained from R by transposing ak and al. There are four cases to consider.
Case 1: (x; y) = (a1; a2) or (a2; a1). Suppose rst that for some string w,
B(R) = a1a2w, implying B(R
12) = a2a1w
since B is Neutral. The denition of  implies that
( B)(R) = a2a1w and ( B)(R12) = a1a2w:
The equivalence (2) follows since both sides are false if (x; y) = (a1; a2) and
true if (x; y) = (a2; a1) (note that R
xy = Ryx). The case where B(R) =
a2a1w for some string w is similar. In other cases, B(R) belongs to Fix
(i.e., a1 or a2 is third or worse). Since B is Neutral, B(R
12) also belongs to
Fix. We therefore have (4). The conclusion (2) then follows from (3).
Case 2: (x; y) = (a1; ak) or (ak; a1) for some k =2 f1; 2g. Suppose rst
that B(R) = a1a2w. As before, B(R
1k) = aka2w
0, where w0 is obtained
from w by replacing ak by a1. Also, ( B)(R) = a2a1w and ( B)(R1k) =
aka2w
0; hence the equivalence (2) follows. Incidentally, the existence of
proles belonging to this case (the prole where every individual has the
same preference a1a2w is an example) exhibit that   B is not Neutral : if
it were, then ( B)(R) = a2a1w would imply ( B)(R1k) = a2akw0. The
cases B(R) = a2a1w, a2akw, aka2w are similar. In other cases, both B(R)
and B(R1k) 2 Fix (if the latter were not true, then B(R1k) could be written
a1a2w or a2a1w for some w; this should lead to a contradiction). The rest
of the proof runs as before.
Case 3: (x; y) = (a2; ak) or (ak; a2) for some k =2 f1; 2g. Suppose rst
that B(R) = a1a2w. As before, B(R
2k) = a1akw
0, where w0 is obtained
from w by replacing ak by a2. Also, ( B)(R) = a2a1w and ( B)(R2k) =
a1akw
0; hence the equivalence (2) follows. The cases B(R) = a2a1w, a1akw,
aka1w are similar. In other cases, both B(R) and B(R
2k) 2 Fix. The rest
of the proof runs as before.
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Case 4: (x; y) = (ak; al) or (al; ak) for some k, l =2 f1; 2g. Suppose rst
that B(R) = a1a2w. As before, B(R
kl) = a1a2w
0, where w0 is obtained
from w by transposing ak and al. Also, (  B)(R) = a2a1w and ( 
B)(Rkl) = a2a1w
0; hence the equivalence (2) follows. The case B(R) =
a2a1w is similar. In other cases, both B(R) and B(R
kl) 2 Fix. The rest of
the proof runs as before.
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